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Abstract 
This paper is a critical examination of the European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) and its importance for the EU as an actor in international security. 
The ESDP, far from being irrelevant, allows the EU to assume a meaningful role 
in the areas of civilian and military crisis management, albeit on a smaller-scale. 
In the multipolar, post-Cold War world, it is increasingly important for the EU to 
be able to assume a security role, something it has been sorely lacking since its 
inception. The body of this paper is divided into 3 sections. The first section 
explains both how and why the ESDP came into being, and also discusses the 
European Security Strategy (ESS). The second section examines the role of the 
ESDP in the contemporary international security world, and explores the 
EU/ESDP and US/NATO relationship, the ESDP and Russia relationship, and 
how the ESDP fits into the five key threats of the ESS (terrorism, WMDs, 
regional conflicts, failed states, and organized crime). The final section of the 
thesis explains the future role of the ESDP, and discusses the capabilities issue 
and the future of the EU/ESDP and US/NATO relationship.  
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1 Introduction 
The creation of the ESDP has signaled the ushering in of a new era for the 
European Union in the realm of international relations. The name itself (European 
Security and Defence Policy) describes something that has never really existed 
before in the European sphere. For the latter half of the 20
th
 century, the collective 
security of Europe was something that fell firmly within the realm of NATO. But 
with the end of the Cold War, the international security situation began to change 
drastically. The ongoing development of the ESDP can be perceived as a natural 
consequence in response to these changes. As the European Union has continued 
to expand and assume a greater role on the world stage, it has also needed to 
devise a means that would allow it assert itself in matters of security. Relying 
solely on means of ‘soft power’, as the EU has been apt to do for the greater part 
of its lifetime, is oftentimes simply not enough should a serious crisis or conflict 
emerge. Sometimes force is needed to back up diplomatic initiatives. The EU 
experienced its own shortcomings in the area of conflict management when the 
crises erupted in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. The EU, with virtually no 
collective means of ‘hard power’ at its disposal, was left on the sidelines while 
NATO and the US effectively had to bear the full responsibility for managing a 
crisis that was in the EU’s own backyard. The inability of the EU to manage such 
a conflict that was so close to home made it clear that the EU needed its own 
means of providing military and civilian assets for conflict prevention and crisis 
management. The ESDP has been the EU’s answer to these concerns, and its 
impact on the EU as an actor in the realm of international security is something 
that needs to be explored.  
1.1 Problem 
The very existence of the ESDP goes against conventional wisdom when it comes 
to security matters. International relations theories have told us time and time 
again that when it comes to security, it is the nation-state that matters. If we are to 
heed the teachings of realism, “security interests are perceived to be in conflict 
rather than complementary, interstate politics tends to be a zero-sum game – that 
is, if one state wins, another must lose” (Hix, 2005: 375). When dealing with 
security matters, nation-states are motivated by their own self-interests, and are 
oftentimes hesitant if not outright standoffish when faced with the prospect of 
security cooperation. Therefore cooperation between states is unlikely as there is 
little opportunity for the provision of a common public good, and there are no 
credible enforcing agents in a system of anarchy (Ibid). Unlikely is the key word 
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here. Generations of US theorists have been weaned on neo-realism and tend to 
see all power relations in terms of balancing, bandwagoning, and buckpassing 
(Howorth, 84: 2006). The ESDP represents an anomaly in the face of such 
theoretical assumptions. The fact remains that the ESDP does exist, the nation-
states of the EU are cooperating in security matters, and they are doing so for 
reasons which are not motivated solely by national self-interest. Isn’t this 
interesting, if not strange? Economic cooperation is one thing, but the military 
cooperation we have seen amongst the EU member states in the form of the ESDP 
is very unexpected. Such a scenario consequently gives rise to a variety of 
questions. But in order to make the focus of this essay more clear for the reader, 
the research problem and general direction of the essay can be summed up as 
follows:  
 
Why does something like the ESDP even exist? How does it impact the role of the 
EU as a unitary actor in security matters? What significance does it have for the 
international security environment?  
 
     Aside from the theoretical paradox that arises when attempting the frame the 
ESDP, other ambiguities arise. For example, what is it and what it is for? Some 
are under the impression that the ESDP represents an effort to establish a 
European army or that it is meant to function as a European NATO. Others 
believe that the ESDP is supposed to be a tool that can allow the EU to force its 
collective will where it sees fit. Some even believe that it is meant to help the EU 
‘balance’ against the US (at least in the realist sense). However, none of these 
assumptions are true. Yes, the ESDP does represent the ‘strong arm’ of the CFSP 
in areas where means of ‘soft power’ alone are not sufficient. It represents 
something dramatically different when compared to the traditional 
‘normative/soft/civilian power’ role we have commonly associated with the EU. 
The EU has always relied on economic, cultural, and political tools to reach its 
foreign policy goals, and has stressed “the acceptance of the necessity of 
cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives and a 
concentration on non-military means to secure goals” (Smith, 15: 2003). But now 
– for  the first time – the EU possesses military capabilities that can allow it to 
make a collective contribution as a security actor. The ESDP signifies “the 
institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part 
of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments, together with 
the EU’s legitimacy as an international actor with military capabilities” (Cornish, 
587: 2001). The ESDP represents something new and exciting for political 
scientists. After reading the essay, the reader should have a thorough 
understanding of why the ESDP is important, how it allows the EU to deal with 
contemporary security threats, and what its significance is for both the EU and the 
global security environment. 
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1.2 Theory 
Theories such as federalism, neo-functionalism, and liberal intergovernmentalism 
are excellent theoretical tools for explaining European integration. However, they 
focus most of their attention on the internal dynamics of the EU and shy away 
from matters of security. If the main focus of this essay was to explain how the 
ESDP came into being, then these theories could be helpful in understanding how 
and why this occurred. But the problem is that these theories focus on economic, 
political, and cultural factors (all of which are important), but they make very 
little mention of security. This essay is concerned with the external security role 
that the ESDP allows the EU to assume, so the absence of such theories should 
not come as a shock to the reader.  
     Since this is the case, perhaps one could turn to theories of international 
relations for theoretical assistance? The three dominant theoretical frameworks in 
contemporary international relations are liberalism, constructivism, and realism. 
Liberalism asserts “the primacy of economics and societal economic interests over 
politics and power relations” (Hix, 2005: 376). But the ESDP was not created as a 
response to economic concerns, so liberalism is not relevant given the context of 
this thesis. Then we have constructivism, which “sees international relations as 
dominated by cultural, ideological, and ideational forces” (Ibid).  Constructivism 
is a bit more relevant, but not exactly what I am looking for. That leaves realism, 
which at first glance seems the most relevant. After all, realism focuses on the 
belief that states are motivated by the desire for economic and military security or 
power, as opposed ideals or ethics. However, the focus is on the nation-state, and 
neither the EU nor the ESDP are nation-states. So how can realism explain the 
ESDP?  
     Well, in a sense realism is a theory that can be helpful for understanding what 
the ESDP is not intended to do. Realists regard the nation-state as the primary 
actor in international politics, and place the emphasis on power politics and 
persistent ‘balancing’ between states. According to this theory, “international 
politics is driven by an endless struggle for power which has its roots in human 
nature” (Baylis, 149: 2001). In addition to this, “sovereign states are rational self-
seeking actors resolutely if not exclusively  concerned with relative gains because 
they must function in an anarchical environment in which their security and well-
being ultimately rest on their ability to mobilise their own resources against 
external threats” (Burchil, 87: 2001). When placed against this backdrop, the 
purpose of the ESDP inevitably leads to all sorts of confusion. According to 
realism and other theories of international relations, nation-states are the primary 
security actors, but the EU is not a nation-state. So when an entity like the EU 
attempts to become a security actor through something like the ESDP, it becomes 
difficult to apply traditional international relations theories. The convergence of 
individual security interests through the ESDP goes against the norm, especially 
considering that “from a realist perspective this is unlikely, as security interests 
tend not to vary over time” (Hix, 2005: 399). And when considering the ESDP, 
one needs to realize that it “is not designed to “balance” US power in the 
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structural realist sense” and “the EU has set its face squarely against the sorts of 
considerations of power politics that are inherent in structural realist logic and lie 
at the heart of “balancing”” (Howorth, 84: 2006). The ESDP represents something 
new, and is therefore difficult for international relations scholars to pinpoint. The 
guiding principles behind the ESDP are pragmatic, institutional, international, 
multilateral, multi-level, rules-based, and transformative, rather than strategic, 
coercive, self-interested, and military (Ibid). Since none of the aforementioned 
theories can provide a complete framework for this thesis, the essay will instead 
be explanatory in nature and provide a critical assessment of the ESDP. 
1.3 Method 
This paper represents a “deviant” case-study. When a body of theory is fairly well 
developed and substantial evidence has confirmed it, a detailed study of a deviant 
case can be illuminating (Odell, 2001: 166). Deviant case analyses are studies of 
single cases that are known to deviate from established generalizations (Lijphart, 
1969: 692).The ESDP represents a deviant case because it is an unlikely 
occurrence in the realm of international security relations that does not fit into the 
existing theoretical norms. In response to realism, its existence proves that nation-
states are capable of supranational cooperation in security matters, and are even 
able to do so without being motivated by power politics or the need to maximize 
their own self-interest. Considering a case where the main causes were present but 
the expected effect did not occur might shed light on the theory’s limits, helping 
to identify conditions that are necessary or favorable for its operation (Odell, 
2001: 166). According to realism, which seems to be the dominant theory of 
international relations, something like the ESDP should not even exist. But the 
fact that 25 EU nation-states are cooperating in the realm of security through a 
policy like the ESDP goes to show that realism and its emphasis on self-interested 
nation-states vying for power in an anarchic international environment cannot 
explain everything, especially something like the ESDP.  
     Taking all of the above into account, the body of the essay is divided up into 
three primary sections that are intended to build upon each other. The first section 
describes the evolution of the ESDP, and provides a thorough account of both how 
and why the ESDP came into being. The European Security Strategy (ESS) is also 
put into focus. This is due in no small part to the fact that the ESS is the primary 
doctrine that frames EU foreign policy, especially in areas of international 
security. The second section of the paper examines the contemporary role of the 
ESDP in various matters of international security. How the ESDP affects the 
relationship between the EU and US/NATO is discussed, and this issue is 
explored in further detail in the “three D’s” subsection, which deals with the three 
primary US concerns of de-linking, discriminating, and duplicating. How the 
ESDP influences the EU/Russia relationship is also touched upon. After this, the 
ESDP is put to the test when it is faced with the 5 key threats of the ESS, namely 
terrorism, WMDs, regional conflicts, failed states, and organized crime. The final 
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part of the paper explores what the future role of the ESDP will be. Problems such 
as the inherent lack of ESDP military capabilities and their meaning for the 
effectiveness of the ESDP are discussed. Then the matter of EU/ESDP and 
US/NATO relations is taken one step further, and some answers in regards to how 
the two will continue to coexist going forward is covered. Finally, I will present 
some brief conclusion and discuss them.  
1.4 Material 
The material for this paper was based on both primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources used were rather limited, with the European Security Strategy 
being the one that was utilized most. The bulk of the paper is written based on 
research compiled from secondary sources, with a large amount of the research 
articles and essays providing critical looks at both EU security policy and the 
ESDP. The  majority of these secondary sources were obtained through the ELIN 
system at Lund University. The intention was to use sources that were as up-to-
date as possible and that were analytical rather than descriptive in nature. The 
ESDP has only been in existence since 1999, so there is still a dearth of books 
written about it. However, I have hardly found this to be a hinderance while 
writing the paper. The ESDP is by no means a stagnant policy, and it has 
continued to evolve since its inception. Given this, much of the research done 
about it is also constantly evolving, and it is an exciting subject to research 
considering its relatively new and unexplored nature. The paper is not overly 
reliant on any one source, and can therefore give a more unbiased and nuanced 
account of the the subject matter.  
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2 The Evolution of the ESDP 
Many are under the impression that the beginnings of a common European 
defence community first began with the establishment of the ESDP in 1999. In 
actuality, Europe “tried to establish a defence community nearly fifty years ago in 
1954, when it failed” (Guttman, 2002). This is due in no small part to the fact that 
at the time the Cold War was still in full swing, and the United States felt that it 
was necessary to shoulder most of the burden for the security of Western Europe. 
During the Cold War, Western Europe acted as a buffer against the Soviet Union, 
and thus was of vital strategic importance to the United States. However, the 
eventual end of the Cold War and the subsequent fall of Communism changed the 
nature of the transatlantic security situation significantly. Europe was no longer as 
vital to US interests. So it was then only a matter of time before Europe would 
begin to take the issue of establishing a common European defence policy into its 
own hands.  
Throughout the 1990s, numerous events transpired that ultimately culminated 
in the establishment of the ESDP. One of the most important was the establisment 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1992. The CFSP was especially 
significant, because it specifically covered the issue of defence. Its predecessor, 
the European Political Community, “had not discussed defence issues at all: 
NATO was the organization responsible for defence” (Smith, 2003: 41). Europe 
was beginning to take collective action for its own security, and set about doing 
this partly through various treaties, such as the ‘Petersberg tasks’. These tasks – 
which include, but are not limited to, humanitarian and rescue tasks 
preacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking – gave a new facet to the EU’s external role and also opened the 
door for the use of military force by the Union (Duke, 2006: 479). It must be 
noted that these tasks “fall short of NATO article 5 collective self-defence 
abilities” (Gunning, 2001: 1). At the time (1992) these tasks were intended to help 
manage a possible destabilization in Eastern Europe (in the wake of the fall of 
Communism), and by the end of the decade this destabilization is exactly what 
happened, with far-reaching implications for the evolution of a more robust 
European defence policy. Another important event was the Amsterdam Treaty in 
1997, which was significant because “what had previously been referred to as the 
‘eventual framing of a common defence policy’ was now rather referred to as the 
ongoing ‘progressive framing of a common defence policy’” (Strömvik, 2005: 
112). The tasks for this policy were to be built on the goals set out by the 
Petersberg Tasks. 
All of the above events were certainly instrumental in the evolution of the 
ESDP. But it was undoubtedly the crises in the Balkans during the 1990s that 
really brought to light the shortcomings of European defence policy coordination. 
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So it can be said that the Balkan crises served as a catalyst for the creation of the 
ESDP. The EU’s inability to tackle the build-up of the crisis in Kosovo and the 
ambivalance and delays in US policy were vital factors in creating a foreign 
policy demand for some new initiative (Cornish, 2001: 588). The US more or less 
shouldered the entire burden for the campaign, which inevitably had negative 
consequences. The political tensions felt on both sides of the Atlantic regarding 
burden sharing and power sharing can be summed up succinctly: Americans 
resent being asked to shoulder more than their fair share of the military burden, 
while Europeans resent being dictated to by the United States (Hulsman, 2000). In 
addition to this, “the crises in the Balkans, which dominated the 1990s, created a 
powerful stimulus because the former Yugoslavia is situated inside today’s 
European Union (Howorth, 2006: 84). In essence, “Kosovo highlighted the EU’s 
inability to address crises in its own back yard” (Gunning, 2001: vii).  A former 
German foreign minister described it quite well when when he stated, "the 
Kosovo war was mainly an expression of Europe's own insufficiency and 
weakness; we as Europeans never could have coped with the Balkan wars that 
were caused by Milosevic without the help of the U.S." (Hulsman, 2000). Europe 
obviously needed to do something about this situation, especially since similar 
problems could always arise in the future. 
In the late 1990s the UK did an about-face which ended up having a profound 
impact on the development of the ESDP. The real beginning of the drive was a 
conference in Saint Malo in December 1998, where Prime Minister Tony Blair 
turned his back on 50 years of British skepticism and agreed that the European 
pillar of NATO should be built using the EU as its base (ibid). The British desire 
to establish common European operational and military capabilities coincided 
with German and French interests, and the culmination of this course of events 
was the British-French ‘Saint Malo’ declaration. This ground-breaking declaration 
proved to be the diplomatic turning point in the creation of the ESDP as it 
affirmed that the EU required “the capacity for autonomous  action, backed up by 
a credible military force, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do 
so, in order to respond to international crises” so that the EU could “take decisions 
and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged” 
(Watanbe, 2005: 7). The Saint Malo declaration can be seen as the point when 
both the framework and main objectives of the ESDP were finally established. All 
of the aforementioned developments (the dwindling strategic importance of 
Europe for the US, the Balkan crises, and the need for the EU to have capable 
military and operational capabilities for crisis management home and abroad) and 
the need to deal with them ultimately came together in the form of the ESDP. It 
can be said that “these three developments sychronized neatly with the 
endogenous dynamics of the European Union itself as it ceased to be ‘just’ a 
market and aspired to emerge as a political actor on the world stage” (Howorth, 
2006: 84). For the first time, Europe was beginning to assume a collective role as 
an actor in international security. What ended up happening is that from 1998 to 
2002, the ESDP advanced at each successive European Council, and eventually 
became a reality.  
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All of these events came to a head when the ESDP was formally established at 
the Cologne European Council in June 1999. What ended up happening is that the 
15 members of the EU signed up to the objectives that were set out at Saint Malo 
the previous year. The next major step was the Helsinki European Council in 
December 1999. The two main proposals made at Helsinki were the development 
of rapidly deployable European military capabilities (the ‘Headline Goal’) to 
undertake humanitarian and peacekeeping roles (also known as the ‘Petersberg 
Tasks’) and the establishment of new EU security institutions (Oakes, 2001: 9). 
The goal of having 50,000-60,000 troops ready by the year 2003 for operations 
lasting up to one year gave the EU member states an ambitious goal to strive for 
(Duke, 2006:479). This “Euro-army” – the so-called European Rapid Reaction 
Force (ERRF) was set to be the heart of the ESDP, with “the aim is to be able to 
deploy a force of up to 60,000 soldiers, backed by the necessary heavy lift, 
communications, ships and aircraft and to command, protect and sustain it” 
(Jenkin: 2002). On top of this, “It means 180,000 when you actually take the 
rotation into account” (Guttman, 2002). And when one also considers that this 
force is meant to be deployed within 60 days, it becomes apparent that this was no 
small undertaking.  
The Feira European Council in June 2000 added civilian aspects of crisis 
management to ESDP actions. This brought the ESDP closer to its goal of being 
“an instrument to undertake the full range of conflict prevention and crisis-
management operations defined by the Petersburg Tasks through a mixture of 
military and civilian means” (Berenskoetter, 15: 2006). Following the Nice Treaty 
in 2000, numerous security institutions were also established within the Council 
structure in order to oversee the ESDP. Among them “a Political Security 
Committee (PSC) [that] is [meant] to coordinate day-to-day running of the EU's 
foreign and security policy; former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana heads 
this effort” (Hulsman, 2000). Both an EU military committee (EUMC) and EU 
military staff (EUMS) were also created. The EUMC is an EU military authority 
and the EUMS is tasked with implementing the decision making of the EUMC, 
performing early warning, situation assessments, and strategic planning for crisis 
management, including the identification of relevant forces (Watanbe, 2005: 7). 
The ESDP was finally declared fully operational at the Laeken European Council 
in 2001, although the process of developing its capabilities continued.  
2.1 The European Security Strategy and beyond 
Even though the ESDP was now fully operational and capable of carrying out 
crisis management operations, it still lacked a doctrine that could provide a 
framework or explanation for its actions abroad. In response to this, in 2003 the 
ESDP created what is known as the European Security Strategy. Entitled “A 
Secure Europe in a Better World”, this document can be perceived as the 
European counterpart to the National Security Strategy of the United States. 
Though it did not chart a specific course of action, this document for the first time 
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offerred an EU-wide threat assessment and an acknowledgement that the EU had 
to take on a global responsibility as a security actor (Giegerich, 2006: 387). Part 
of the underpinning rationale also seems to also be collective self-interest; the 
European Security Strategy affirms that “A European Union which takes greater 
responsibility and which is more active will be one that carries greater political 
weight” (Duke, 2006: 485). It identifies 5 key threats: terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), failed states, organized crime, and regional conflicts – 
essentially the same as those seen by the United States (Howorth, 2006: 83). In 
contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is 
purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means (Solana, 2003: 
7). In addition to this, the root causes of these problems “incoroporate diverse 
factors such as imbalance of political, socio-economic or cultural opportunities 
amongst different identity groups; lack of democratic legitimacy and effectiveness 
of governance; lack of effective mechanisms for the peaceful conciliation of group 
interests and the lack of a vibrant civil society” (Duke, 2006: 484). However, the 
EU approach towards these threats is somewhat more nuanced than that of the US. 
The US tends to view these threats and their causes in more black and white 
terms, and subsequently seeks to deal with them through a more heavy-handed 
approach, military or otherwise. George W. Bush and his national security team 
have launched a new strategy of pre-emption and, if necessary, military 
intervention (Rummel, 2002: 453). On the other hand, the EU sees these threats as 
being much more complex, and thus tries to tackle them in a more comprehensive 
way. Javier Solana is pleading for security responses that ‘are not just 
comprehensive, integrated and long-term, but also broadly owned and managed 
(Ibid). And in his own words, “conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot 
start too early” (Solana, 6: 2003). 
In order to deal with these threats, the Security Strategy gives the EU 3 key 
strategies for defending its security and promoting its values. The first strategy is 
“to confront threats by conducting a policy of conflict prevention using a 
combination of civilian and military capabilities” (“Brief”, 2005: 12). These 
civilian and military capabilities will be discussed later throughout the “ESDP and 
the Five Key Threats of the ESS” section. Even though the EU is somewhat 
lacking in collective military capabilities in order to undertake large-scale conflict 
prevention, management, and reconstruction, it still has powerful trade and 
development polices that it can use in combination with its rapid reaction force in 
order to provide solutions on a somewhat smaller-scale. The military and civilian 
tools contained within the ESDP give the EU a unique combination of hard 
military power and soft civilian and diplomatic power. In its diversity the EU’s 
range of instruments far out outstrips that of other international organizations, for 
example the OSCE or NATO (Flechtner, 1: 2006). But in theory, at least, the 
European arrangements have the advantage, in terms of being able to conduct a 
crisis management operation that does not require a formal handing of 
responsibility from one institution to another – with all the inherent difficulties 
that such a process can entail (Hunter, 86: 2002). Given that all of the 5 threats 
mentioned earlier are quite complex, the EU is “particularity well-equipped to 
deal with such multi-faceted situations” (Solana, 7: 2003).   
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The second strategy is “to build security in the European neighbourhood by 
acting in the Middle East, Balkans, and Caucasus” (“Brief”, 2005: 12). As the EU 
continues to expand, the integration and stabilization of the states in and at its 
borders is increasingly important. The intended effect of the two aformentioned 
strategies is to create “a ring of friends from the Caucasus to to the Balkans and 
around the Medditteranean” (Howorth, 2006: 83). The third strategy set out in the 
Security Strategy is “to promote effective multilateralism by defending and 
developing international law, in line with the United Nations Charter” (“Brief”, 
2005: 12). Unlike the US, the EU is committed to develop and uphold 
international law, with the United Nations providing the benchmark for 
international legitimacy.  
The next major step for the ESDP was when the member state governments 
adopted the “Headline Goal 2010” in 2004. This Headline Goal 2010 was an 
expansion of the the Headline Goal that was established in Helsinki in 1999. It 
was reflective of the objectives of the European Security Strategy, and thus part of 
its purpose was to tackle the 5 aforementioned threats from a military standpoint 
through the establishment of the so-called battle-group concept. The battle-group 
concept envisages the creation of tactical groups, comprising approximately 1500 
troups, including support, to be ready for deployment within 15 days (Watanabe, 
2005: 8). Initial operational capability was achieved in 2005, with full capability 
planned for 2007 (Giegerich, 2006: 387). The EU was no longer only concerned 
with the objectives set out in the Petersburg tasks, and needed to expand its 
missions into areas such as disarmament operations, support for third countries in 
fighting terrorism, and security sector reform missions. This is why these 
battlegroups are so important, because they “are designed to improve the EU’s 
rapid response capability and are able to carry out autonomous operations or 
contribrute to the initial phase of a large-scale operation” (“Brief”, 2005: 43). The 
intention was to eventually be able to deploy two of these battlegroups 
simultaneously. As of 2006, the EU had “a capacity of 18 battlegroups provided 
by 21 Member States, plus niche capabilities which provide them with specific 
elements for added value” (Ibid: 44). If successfully implemented, the battle-
group concept will fill an important capability gap (Watanabe, 2005: 8).  
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3 The ESDP Today 
3.1 Relations with NATO 
It would be a gross oversight to discuss the ESDP without also covering its 
relationship with NATO. Indeed, the ESDP was born out of the desire to make a 
functioning European pillar within NATO. In this section of the paper the US is 
often mentioned in the same breath as NATO, because it is through NATO that 
the US exerts much of its influence in Europe. As mentioned earlier, the end of 
the Cold War brought with it an unwillingness of behalf of the US to continue to 
shoulder all of the burden of European security. The task of NATO in Europe was 
and still is the defence of the European territorial space, but the US wanted 
Europe to be able to manage its own security problems to a greater extent. 
Beginning in 1993, the United States began giving strong support to the 
development of a vigorous “European pillar” within the Atlantic Alliance (Hunter, 
2002: xiii). But it was not until the operation against Serbian aggression in 
Kosovo in 1999 that the gap between American (through NATO) and European 
security capabilities became readily apparent. The Kosovo campaign significantly 
hastened the process begun at Saint Malo by forcing the Europeans to recognize 
the growing gap between American and European military capabilities (Hulsman, 
2000). The process of establishing the ESDP picked up a large amount of 
momentum, which eventually led to the ultimate establishment of the ESDP as a 
functional and viable aspect of EU security policy. But would the establishment of 
an independent European Security pillar diminish the transatlantic importance of 
NATO?  
The Nice Treaty in 2000 was critical for ESDP/NATO relations. This treaty 
made it clear that EU military forces are independent from NATO, planning and 
decision-making for many operations can and will be done outside of NATO, and 
that the EU will retain full political and strategic control throughout any operation 
(Jenkin: 2002). What was outlined in the treaty is somewhat out of line with US 
expectations towards the ESDP, as summed up by George W. Bush: “It is 
essential that the EU develop capabilities that enable it to act when NATO as a 
whole is not engaged, in a manner that is fully coordinated, compatible, and 
transparent with NATO, and to provide for the fullest participation of non-EU 
European military allies” (Zervoudaki, 8: 2006). The concerns about NATO being 
threatened has led to a ‘yes, but’ “approach to the ESDP that has in general 
welcomed a stronger European approach to international security and improved 
European military capabilities as long as long as it remains assured that NATO 
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will not be undermined” (Giegerich, 2006: 388) The US (in particular through 
NATO), has always had a kind of conditional support towards the ESDP. As 
stated earlier, the US has always supported an increased capacity for European 
security in order to balance the burden sharing. But this support has always been 
conditional because the United States remains intent on ESDP not being allowed 
to impinge on US flexibility nor on NATO as America’s chief instrument for 
exerting influence in Europe (Peter, 2004: 396). Furthermore, “We [the US] 
would not want to see and ESDI [ESDP’s predecessor] that comes into being first 
within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO” 
(Giegerich, 2006: 390).  
At times it almost seems as if the US attitude towards the ESDP is 
schizophrenic in nature. On one hand, the US says that it wants the EU to build up 
its own security capabilities. On the other hand, when the EU actually does so 
through such means as the ESDP, the US contradicts itself by becoming anxious 
and suspicious and says “no you can’t do that”. Such concerns have been 
encouraged due to the “constructive ambiguity [that] has been built into its 
[ESDP] construction in order to accommodate continued divergences between 
member states about the desired relationship between the EU and NATO” 
(Watanabe, 2005: 5). Different member states have different attitudes towards 
NATO, so the construction of the ESDP itself is at times unclear in order to 
accommodate these divergent viewpoints. Those major EU member states with 
less intense military and defence industrial linkages with the US, namely France 
and Germany, tend to take a maximal view of what is meant by ‘capacity for 
autonomous action’ than Britain, which is more intensely integrated with US 
military and intelligence capabilities, and has significant defence industrial 
linkages with the US (Ibid: 19). It seems that “the United States’ unilateral 
impulse and the Europeans striving for autonomy are viewed as two sides of the 
same coin. They lead to ambiguities and breed mutual suspicion, undermining the 
credibility of as well as confidence in each partner’s respective readiness to 
cooperate and comprimise” (Peters, 2004: 383). To make matters worse, much of 
the language contained within both Headline Goals stresses the need for the EU to 
be able to undertake autonomous action, which obviously creates a dilemma 
between NATO and its relations with the EU. The ambiguity in regards to where 
NATO stops and the ESDP starts has led to concerns, in particular from the US. 
3.2  The Three D’s  
As a response to ESDP/NATO concerns, US Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright stated what became known as the “three D’s” at the NATO foreign 
ministers’ meeting in Brussels in December 1998. These three D’s were de-
linking, discriminating, and duplicating, with decoupling forming a supplemental 
“fourth D”. Madeleine Albright’s “three D’s” were not new when formulated in 
1998 but but merely resembled the traditional baseline of US policy on this 
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matter, at least since the early 1980s (Ibid: 396). These “three D’s” continue to 
outline American expectations towards the ESDP to this day.  
3.2.1 De-linking 
The first “D” – de-linking – clearly related to the idea of “autonomous” 
European action introduced in the Saint Malo declaration, along with the absence 
of the ritual words “seperable but not separate” military capabilities (Hunter, 
2002: 34). In order for the US to allocate NATO resources (which were largely 
US resources) and support  to common European security endeavours, it was vital 
that the guidelines established at Saint Malo were followed. Another concern that 
fell under the first “D” of de-linking was that of decoupling. The US was 
concerned that transatlantic security would be decoupled, meaning “that the 
European allies taking part in the ESDI [European Security and Defence Identity, 
which became the ESDP] could create circumstances in which they would see 
their security as somehow decoupled from the Atlantic framework” (Ibid: 35). 
This has been of great concern to certain US policy makers, with one even going 
so far as to say "If the Europeans desire and then achieve a separate unified 
military capacity without recourse to the U.S., they will have eliminated the 
rationale for NATO as we have known it" (Hulsman, 2000). Others have stated “I 
look upon it [ESDP] as being virtually an abrogation [abolishment] of European 
responsibility to NATO” (Gunning, 2001: 13).  
 However, such statements ignore the fact that if "If Europe takes on more 
responsibility by building up its military strength, that will contribute to the long-
term equilibrium of the alliance" (Hulsman, 2000). In addition to this, “some 
European military capacity, not solely bound up in NATO could actually reassure 
Europeans of their ability to take some actions in circumstances in which the 
United States chose not to  become engaged” (Hunter, 2002: 35). And when I talk 
about equilibrium or balancing here, it is not balancing in the traditional realist 
sense. The ESDP was never created in the spirit of power politics and it was never 
intended to replace NATO. All of the historical events mentioned earlier (the 
dwindling strategic importance of Europe for the US, the Balkan crises, and the 
need for the EU to have capable military and operational capabilities for crisis 
management home and abroad) brought about the need for the ESDP, rather than 
any desire on behalf of the EU to create a counterweight to the US and NATO. 
Although more recent events, namely the Iraq War, exasperated transatlantic 
tensions and led certain EU member states (in particular France and Germany) to 
see the need for a counterbalance to US unilateralism.  
3.2.2 Discriminating 
The second “D” mentioned by Albright stands for discriminating. There was a 
concern that the ESDP would “lead to different kinds of discrimination against 
non-EU members of NATO, perhaps even creating an EU caucus within NATO” 
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(Geigerich, 2006: 388). Would these states be able to take part in ESDP military 
operations? In one form or another, virtually all of the NATO states that do not 
belong to the EU have made clear their concerns about being sidelined in the 
event of a military action within the framework of the ESDP (Hunter, 2002: 38). 
The big issue is being able to participate if they choose to do so, because 
“traditionally neutral non-NATO members of the EU have no interest in turning 
the EU into a collective defence organization like NATO” (Gunning, 2001: 25).  
 This issue has been of particular concern to Turkey. Turkey is a NATO 
member that at the same time has been trying to gain acceptance into the EU. One 
needs to keep in mind that “at the beginning of the 21
st
 century institutions 
become tools of identity building, inclusion, and exclusion. Turkey’s concerns 
about being included into the new, emergent military architecture in Europe are 
about belonging to Europe” (Terzi, 2002: 58). To compound the situation further 
for Turkey, “as ESDI-ESDP has developed beyond the necessary reliance on 
NATO assets and Turkey’s potential veto [being that Turkey is a NATO member 
and entitled to veto], the issue by 2000 became whether Turkey would be able to 
take part in the full range of discussions and decisions within EU institutions” 
(Hunter, 2002: 38). Not only this, but “most of the regions that the EU crisis-
management forces are expected to serve are neighbouring regions to Turkey and 
thus are of vital importance to Turkey’s security” (Terzi, 2002: 55). If the EU 
conducts autonomous operations without recourse to NATO in Turkey’s 
backyard, it puts Turkey in a rather uncomfortable situation (because Turkey 
would not be able to have any influence on the operations). The Turks have 
indicated that they will work against ESDP within NATO if they continue to be 
excluded (Gunning, 2001: 27). The case of Turkey is representative of the 
dilemma facing other non-EU members of NATO – Canada, Iceland, Norway, 
United States – whose primary dilemma with the ESDP is the prospect of being 
left out of the formal decision-making process.  
3.2.3 Duplicating 
The third “D” – duplicating – is the one that perhaps lies highest on the list of 
US concerns. There is the fear that the ESDP will duplicate existing NATO assets 
and capabilities, thus diminishing the importance of NATO. On the face of it, 
Secretary Albright’s injunction “to avoid duplicating existing efforts” was simply 
a US plea for the Europeans, in crafting ESDI, not to spend scarce resources on 
trying to create a second set of capabilities that they could just as easily obtain 
from NATO (Hunter, 2002: 41). Why try to duplicate what NATO can already do 
effectively? It seems like overkill to spend unneccessary funds on military 
hardware when any substantial military conflict the ESDP would be likely to get 
involved in would likely also engage the United States and NATO, thus making 
any attempted duplication of NATO capabilites pale in comparision if a large-
scale crisis should arise. Many Americans “worry that ESDP will unecessarily 
duplicate NATO’s efforts and complicate decision-making without adding much 
military value” (Gordon, 215: 2004). The problem for Europe, as history and 
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current levels of expenditure show, is not that it will do too much regarding 
defense spending, which is the only way ESDP could develop to the point at 
which it would threaten to make NATO superfluous; it is that Europe consistently 
does too little (Hulsman, 2000). Despite recent the increases it remains the case 
that Europe’s comparative lack of military effectiveness has less to do with 
abstract problems of institutional development, and rather more with the absence 
of vital, concrete military equipment (Payne, 2003: 18). This is not likely to be 
remedied anytime soon given the rather small budget that the ESDP is alloted. In 
reality, “Europe's security and defense policy will continue to be on a much too 
modest scale to really worry the US” (Hulsman, 2000). However, most EU 
governments realize that promoting security  involves a lot more than just military 
power. According to Javier Solana, “Threats cannot be tackled by purely military 
means. Rather, they require a systematic policy of preventive engagement by the 
Union which must be ready to use the full panapoly of tools – economic, political, 
military – at its disposal to confront threats as they emerge” (Payne, 2003: 14). So 
even though the EU military capabilities pale in comparison to NATO, it still has 
powerful trade and development polices that it can use in combination with the 
civilian and military capabilities of the ESDP in order to provide solutions on a 
somewhat smaller-scale 
3.3 ESDP and Russia 
In contrast to the United States, Russia has consistently showed strong support for 
the ESDP since its inception. This is due to several factors, all of which are 
influenced by Russia’s changing geopolitical profile since the end of the Cold 
War. Initial enthusiasm was motivated by a hope that the ESDP should constitute 
an alternative pole in the global security architecture to the United States and 
NATO; more recent efforts are the product of worsening EU-Russian relations 
and Russia’s gradual marginalization from the policing of Europa (Geigerich, 
387: 2006). The relationship between Russia and NATO has always been 
somewhat strained. After all, NATO was established in large part to counter the 
military might of the Soviet Union. But with the end of the Cold War, the 
relationship began to thaw somewhat. And now that Europe is seeking 
responsibility for its own security (through the ESDP) independent of NATO, 
Russia sees an opportunity to influence European security matters that it was 
lacking when NATO was the only military alliance in Europe. In this context, the 
EU is looked upon as a counterweight to a ‘NATO-centric’ European security 
system and as a prospective key actor (‘pole’) in a multipolar world order 
(Rontoyanni, 814: 2002). The increasing EU autonomy in foreign and security 
policy in combination with the development of partnership with Russia would 
bring new opportunities for the latter to reach its security aims and to strengthen 
its own voice in Europe. (Danilov: 2001). Indeed, to Russian policy-makers, the 
ESDP can act as “a new channel for Russia’s inclusion in European policy-
making processes” (Rontoyanni, 818: 2002).  
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     From the beginning, Russia has sought to have a bilateral relationship with the 
ESDP. This has worked out well for Russia, as it has become “the first [and at 
present remains the only] non-member state to gain monthly consultations with 
the EU’s Political and Security Committee (COPS), the main decision-making 
body of the ESDP (Rontoyanni, 814: 2002). This is obviously very important to 
Russia, especially considering that the EU in continuing to expand into what was 
formerly the Soviet Union. This EU expansion has consequently led to conflicts 
of interest from both sides. So if Russia can gain some kind of influence over the 
the EU policy-making process, then it can perhaps consolidate some of the 
influence it has lost in the former Soviet Republics. There has also been a sense of 
urgency from the EU side to establish some kind of coordinated security scheme 
with Russia, largely as a result of the EU’s neighborhood policy. The intention of 
this policy was to integrate the nations on the EU border through a range of social 
and economic incentives. At the same time, Russia has moved to consolidate its 
influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) [an alliance of 
former Soviet Republics] through an economic integration process, bilateral 
energy deals, political support, and military operations (Geigerich, 396: 2006). 
This overlap of interests – particularly in the countries at the EU/Russian border – 
has inevitably led to a mutual need for both the EU and Russia to cooperate in 
security matters. This is why cooperation through the ESDP is essential and can 
be mutually beneficial to both sides.  
3.4 ESDP and the Five Key Threats of the ESS 
The European Security Strategy (ESS) was born out of the need to establish a 
European security doctrine. The disappearance of the bipolar order and the 
reduced threat of state-to-state military confontation, have altered security 
policies, which require a new set of capabilities with which to engage in new 
forms and styles of intervention abroad (Watanabe, 18: 2005). In addition to this 
alteration of the geopolitical landscape, pivotal events accelerated the need for the 
creation and implementation of the ESS. Shortly after the terrorist attacks in the 
US on 11 September 2001 the EU began work on developing a new security 
strategy that would provide strategic context for its action in Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDP areas (Taylor, 3: 2006). The ESS 
established 5 key threats that the EU was faced with: terrorism, the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), regional conflicts, state failure, and 
organized crime. These threats are not unique to the EU, in actuality they are the 5 
greatest threats to international security today. So what role does the ESDP play in 
dealing with each of them? By answering this question one can gain a large 
amount of insight into how much impact the ESDP is having on the EU’s 
contemporary international security profile. The role of the ESDP in dealing with 
each of these threats varies. These threats are oftentimes interconnected in nature, 
so the actions of the ESDP in one area can also affect outcomes in other areas. 
The ESS recognizes “the “complex causes behind international terrorism and 
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recalling the destabilizing effects of regional conflicts such as Kashmir, the Great 
Lakes, and the Korean Peninsula, all of which feed into the cycle of terrorism, 
WMD, state failure, and international criminality” (Howorth, 83: 2006). A 
comprehensive approach involving both the civilian and military crisis 
management capabilities of the ESDP in combination with other EU institutions is 
usually the most effective means of dealing with these threats.  This makes sense, 
seeing as how “the possiblity of structural conflict prevention by the EU has been 
for a long time more successful in comparison with its capacity to achieve actual 
crisis intervention (Rummel, 470: 2002). 
3.4.1 Terrorism 
     The first of the 5 key threats to Europe as outlined in the ESS is terrorism. The 
spectre of a potential terrorist attack had always loomed over Europe, but it was 
not until the events of September 11
th
 that the likelihood of a terrorist attack on 
European soil gained new urgency. And when the bombings in Madrid and 
London occurred, those fears were finally confirmed. So given that the threat is 
real and ever-present, what role has the ESDP had in the “war on terror”? Unlike 
the US, the EU does not have the collective military capabilities through the 
ESDP in order to “take the fight to the terrorists”. Due to its relative lack of 
collective “hard power”, the EU has instead had to primarily rely on means of 
“soft power” in order to contribute to the “war on terror”. It seems that “the EU 
structure explains the reliance on the state to diminish the risk of terrorism” 
(Alvarez-Verdugo, 437: 2006). Given that the terrorist threat cannot always be 
combated through military means, the role of the ESDP in this matter been 
somewhat limited. However, it can fit into the larger picture due to the idea that 
“the EU, with its unique possibility of combining civil and military means, should 
defuse the political tensions and social injustices that provide the breeding-ground 
for hatred and terrorism” (“Assembly”: 2002). The ESS recognizes the root causes 
of terrorism, which “include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social, and 
political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies” 
(Solana, 3: 2003). Obviously, such problems cannot be solved solely through 
something like the ESDP.  
     While efforts above all have focused on police and judicial cooperation, known 
as Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) or the third pillar of the EU, there is also a 
need for action under the ESDP since the European Security Strategy identifies 
terrorism as a threat (“Brief”, 16:  2005). But what kind of action can the ESDP 
realistically take? The European Union has up until the present day responded 
“with measures that include the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to 
attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the 
USA” (Solana, 6: 2003). All of these measures fall outside of the reach of the 
ESDP and its European Rapid Reaction Force. Given this, the role of the ESDP in 
counter-terrorism activity will likely not grow until sometime in the future. In 
November 2004, the Council adopted a ‘conceptual framework on the ESDP 
dimension of the fight against terrorism’, which sets out the points on which the 
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EU will have to work in the future (interoperability of civil and military 
capabilities, creation of a European Nuclear, Biological and Chemical centre, 
etc.)” (“Brief”, 16: 2005).  
When discussing this matter the role of the European Rapid Reaction Force 
(ERRF) inevitably comes up. One would assume that the 60,000-strong ERRF 
could be an effective tool in counter-terrorism operations. However, the threat of 
terrorism is often opaque and hard to pinpoint from a military standpoint. One of 
the problems that the ERRF faces is the fact that it “is vaguely intended for 
peacekeeping and peace making – the so-called Petersberg tasks – which were 
formulated long before September 11
th
” (Jenkin: 2002). September 11
th
 clearly 
changed the rules of the game, and the ERRF – the heart of the ESDP – is 
intended for humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks, both of which have little to do 
with terrorism. In addition to this, NATO already has its own rapid reaction force 
called the Allied Rapid Reaction Corp, which is much larger than the ERRF. The 
announcement in October 2003 of a 9,000 strong [NATO] combat-ready response 
force, able to be deployed anywhere and reach 21,000 by 2006, puts EU progress 
in the shade (Hill, 157: 2004). Indeed, ERRF comprises the very same troops, but 
wearing different hats and without American assistance (Jenkin: 2002). The 
military emphasis on combating terrorism since 9/11 has been focused entirely on 
NATO, primarily because “the kind of military effort most likely required to deal 
with terrorism (more of a “special forces” nature – perhaps backed up with 
precision airpower – rather than that of a rapid reaction corps nature)” (Hunter, 
171: 2002).  
Any truly large-scale conflict would stretch ESDP and ERRF capabilities, 
leading to the need for US and NATO intervention. In reality, “There are few 
cases left in which conflicting American and European interests could compel the 
activation of the European rapid reaction force rather than direct NATO 
involvement” (Hulsman: 2000). However, as happened in Afghanistan (which 
harboured Al-Qaeda and the Taliban), ”the Europeans could cover for US planes 
and troops removed from their own theatre, and provide back-up assistance in 
intelligence, transport, policing, etc. (Hill, 148: 2004). Given all this, it seems as if 
the ESDP and its ERRF could find a niche in the ‘war on terror’ on a smaller scale 
by doing what is was intended to do, which is to undertake humanitarian and 
peacekeeping tasks. By maintaining the peace and helping to rebuild civil society 
in post-conflict regions, the conditions that breed terrorism (such as political 
instability and lack of security) would be less likely to develop. However, this 
could lead to further resentment, with NATO and the US doing the ‘dirty work’ of 
major military operations and leaving role of peacekeeper to the EU.  
3.4.2 WMDs 
Another problem outlined in the ESS is the threat of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs). The EU realizes that this threat is interwoven with 
terrorism, regional conficts, failed states, and international criminality to a large 
extent. Given this, “the EU strategy against WMD proliferation does not reflect 
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any revolutionary change in European policies or actions but is clearly grounded 
in the heritage of the rule of law, multilateralism, economic and political pressure 
on third states, a focus on the political causes of international problems, and 
international cooperation” (Alvarez-Verdugo, 437: 2006). The EU, with its 
60,000-strong ERRF, is certainly not capable of overthrowing any rogue nuclear 
state by using military means. Direct military intervention is not really an 
effective strategy against WMD proliferation anyways, so this is a moot point. 
The ESDP can still play a part in the fight against WMD proliferation by 
assuming an indirect role somewhat similar to the one it has in the fight against 
terrorism.  By using its civilian and military crisis management capabilities to 
maintain stability in failed states and post-conflict regions, the ESDP can perhaps 
aid in the prevention of the conditions inherent in instable regions that can 
endorse WMD proliferation. 
3.4.3 Regional Conflicts 
     According to the ESS, regional conflicts also form a clear threat to EU 
security. The list of reasons for this is long: they destroy human lives and social 
and physical infrastructures, threaten human rights, lead to terrorism, state failure, 
organised crime, and can fuel the demand for WMD (Solana, 4: 2003). In order to 
respond to these threats, the EU has developed methods to manage these conflicts. 
One of the primary reasons for the establishment of the ESDP was the need for 
the EU to have military and operational capabilities for crisis management both at 
home and abroad. As mentioned earlier, this has become increasingly important 
due to the fact that the US is less enthusiastic about defending European security 
than it was during the Cold War. The goals set out at the Helsinki European 
Council in 1999 still frame the crisis management responsibilities within the 
ESDP and CFSP: “a non-military crisis management mechanism will be 
established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and 
resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and 
Member States (Hunter, 85: 2002). The stress was on establishing both military 
and civilian crisis management, as evidenced “by the lessons of the Balkans: the 
need for civilian tools to complement military crisis management” (Duke, 480: 
2006).  It was apparent to the EU that military means alone were not effective at 
crisis management.  
     The ERRF can be effective in the initial stages of a small-scale conflict when 
hostilities are still high. But after the crisis becomes manageable from a military 
standpoint, civilian components to crisis management are also needed. At the 
Feira European Council in 2000, four civilian intervention areas were identified: 
the police, the rule of law, civilian administration, and civilian protection (ibid). 
At this council “it was agreed that EU Member States should be able to provide 
up to 5000 police officers capable of carrying out police operations ranging from 
advisory, assistance, and training tasks to substituing for local police forces” 
(Berenskoetter, 16: 2006). Judges, prosecutors, and penal experts were also 
supposed to be deployed in such missions in order to help rebuild civil society. 
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These civilian missions have included monitoring missions, police missions, and 
advisory missions in the field of rule of law (Geigerich, 387: 2006).  
     The ESDP is already being implemented on three continents and there are a 
total of 11 ESDP operations currently underway [as of 2006], involving around 
9,000 soldiers and approximately 1,000 policemen and civilian experts (Flechtner, 
1: 2006). The vast majority of these operations involve the ESDP intervention in 
some kind of regional conflict. The ESDP and its ability for crisis management 
was first put to the test during its initial missions in Macedonia, Bosnia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Darfur (Sudan). These missions differ 
from others such as those undertaken in Georgia, Indonesia, Iraq, and the Gaza 
strip (all of which only involved the civilian branch of the ESDP) in that the EU 
has been militarily involved in all of them. These were all small-scale missions 
and all could have been easily done without involving the EU, either by a 
coalition of the willing within NATO or under an EU ‘lead nation’ (Gordon, 216: 
2004). However, they provide a good indication of what the ESDP and the EU are 
capable of in when it comes to dealing with smaller-scale regional conflicts. The 
EU is perhaps better placed to take on these types of operations: the scale is not 
too onerous, EU members have a clear national interest in participating, and in 
time the EU will develop the necessary institutional experience and expertise for 
such operations (Payne, 29: 2003).  
     The crisis in Macedonia was of particular concern due to its relatively close 
proximity to the EU border (in this case Greece). It was the first EU-led military 
operation. In Macedonia the EU took over from NATO with the “aim of 
guarenteeing the security and stability in the country in order to facilitate the 
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement [the peace deal signed by 
Macedonian and Albanian representatives]” (“Brief”, 31: 2005). Naysayers were 
quick to point out before the mission in Macedonia that any EU intervention there 
could be due to “temptation, if the political need for an operation arises, to 
conduct an EU-led mission for symbolic purposes, before the EU is ready to do 
so” (Jenkin: 2002). Fortunately for the EU, a small force of about 400 lightly-
armed men was able to successfully complete the mission. The EU continues to be 
active in the region, primarily through civilian means such as the ongoing 
mentoring of the Macedonian police and assistance in the battle against organized 
crime. 
Unlike the mission in Macedonia, which partly used NATO assets, the 
operation in the Democratic Republic of  Congo in 2003 was an entirely 
autonomous EU operation. It was also the first EU military depolyment outside of 
Europe. The Congo operation, in fact, was really a French mission supported by a 
handful of other Europeans, onto which an EU role was grafted (Gordon, 216:  
2004). Nevertheless, it was a step in the right direction. Unrest in a town within 
Congo threatened to spread to the surrounding regions, and EU assistance was 
requested by the United Nations. The amount of troops used was relatively small 
(about 2,000 and involving 6 EU Member States) but still effective. The mandate 
of the force was to secure the town, the refugee centers and the airport, and to 
ensure the safety of the NGOs and United Nations personell (“Brief”, 32: 2005). 
The mission in Congo was also successful, and was noteworthy for a variety of 
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reasons. For one, “autonomous action by the EU, with the help of the ESDP, 
requires military leadership, planning, and practice in all those fields” in addition 
to requiring coordination between “the Member States, the EU institutions, the 
High Representative for CFSP and the EU Military Committee” (Rummel, 464: 
2002). This mission was also significant because “the lessons learned from this 
operation led to some new ESDP concepts: battlegroups, rapid response, EU 
Operations Centre, etc.” (“Brief”, 32: 2005). Both of these missions pale in 
comparison to any large-scale operations taken by major powers like the US and 
NATO. But that still does not diminish their importance when considering them in 
the context of this essay. They were tangible proof that the EU can make a 
meaningful contribution as an international security actor, even if for the time 
being that contribution is still on a somewhat smaller scale. These Balkan and 
Africa missions  were none the less good indicators of the kind of contributions 
the EU could make if continues to develop the will and capability to act militarily 
(Gordon, 216: 2004). The EU continues to provide support in the ESDP context in 
the DRC through providing assistance for ongoing security sector reform in 
addition to continued mentoring of the domestic police forces.  
3.4.4 Failed States 
The role of the ESDP in dealing with state failure – another one of the threats 
outlined by the ESS – is interwoven with its role towards regional conflicts. This 
is hardly surprising, considering how regional conflicts and state failure are 
oftentimes interconnected. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to 
restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis (Solana, 7: 2003). 
In such situations the civilian crisis management capabilities of the ESDP can aid 
in the estabishment or re-establishment of the police, the rule of law, civilian 
administration, and civilian protection. The relatively recent crisis in Darfur has 
allowed the the ESDP to show what it can do in such a situation.  
The crisis in Darfur is characteristic of many of the conflicts in Africa. The 
tribal warfare that has persisted in the Darfur region of Sudan has resulted in death 
on a large scale and threatened to engulf the surrounding regions. More than 
350,000 people have been killed and 2 million displaced since the crisis in Darfur, 
Sudan, erupted in 2003 (Zervoudaki, 3: 2006). The scale of the crisis put Sudan 
ahead of The Democratic Republic of Congo and the previous poll-topper [on the 
‘failed states’ list], Somalia, as well as Iraq (Soares: 2006). The EU realized the 
gravity of the situation, and utilized the military and civilian aspects of the ESDP 
in order to bring some stability and relief to the region. The EU has financed 
diplomatic efforts to bring all sides to the negotiating table and has supported 
efforts by the African Union (AU) peacekeeping forces, known as AMS I and 
AMS II, to stabilize the situation (Zervoudaki, 3: 2006). It was in 2005 that the 
EU decided to provide both military and civilian support through the ESDP. In the 
form of military support, it provided “equipment and assests; planning and 
technical assistance to the AMS II command structure; additional military 
observers; training of AU troops and observers and strategic and tactical support. 
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However, no EU troops have been deployed on the ground” (Taylor, 56: 2006). 
As opposed to the missions in Macedonia and DRC, what happened in Darfur has 
shown that the ESDP can still provide support from a military standpoint without 
actually putting its own troops on the ground. The civilian component of ESDP 
support in Darfur involved “support for the police chain of command, support for 
establishing a police unit within the AU, training, exercises” (“Brief”, 41: 2005) 
which are among several of the civilian intervention areas established at the Feira 
European Council in 2000. It has not only been the EU that has intervened in 
Sudan, NATO has also been involved and offered its support. However, what has 
happened thus far in Darfur has shown that the ESDP can effectively shoulder 
some of the burden that would have previously been exclusively within the realm 
of NATO or the UN.  
3.4.5 Organized Crime 
The role of the ESDP in the fight against organized crime is largely connected to 
its civilian capabilities. According to the ESS, “fostering democracy and enabling 
the governments to tackle organized crime is one of the most effective ways of 
dealing with crime within the EU” (Solana, 6: 2003). The ESDP can enable these 
governments to fight crime by “putting pressure on networks and helping to 
develop and strenghten the capacity of local police and law enforcement agencies” 
(Berenskoetter, 21: 2006). A perfect example of this is when the EU undertook its 
first civilian crisis management operation (and first mission overall) in the 
Western Balkans in 2003. In January 2003, an EU Police Mission (EUPM) was 
sent to Bosnia and Herzogovina (BiH) to upgrade the skills of the country’s police 
forces and help them fight organized crime (Zervoudaki, 2: 2006). The EU did 
this by “training specialists and setting up a specialized government agency” 
(“Brief”, 34: 2005). More specifically, organized crime would be fought by 
“strengthening BiH operational capacity and assisting and planning in conducting 
of major and organized crime investigations, and the implementation of police 
reform, which will create a single structure of policing, improve law-enforcement 
co-operation and reduce corruption” (Berenskoetter, 20:  2006). What has been 
done in BiH largely frames the ESDP approach to fighting organized crime, 
wherin the rebuilding and strengthening of institutions and re-establishment of the 
rule of law are seen as key ingredients in preventing the spread of organized 
crime. If the governments and legal institutions of the nations that the ESDP 
intervenes in are stabilized to a sufficient degree, then it is much more unlikely 
that the various forms of organized crime – trafficking of drugs, women, weapons, 
and illegal migrants, among other things – will be able to thrive. It is of particular 
concern that the EU deal with the aforementioned elements of organized crime, 
especially in those countries that line its borders. And much like the threats of 
terrorism, WMDs, regional conflicts, and failed states, combating organized crime 
is something that requires a comprehensive approach and complete understanding 
of the factors that give rise to it. 
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4 The Future of the ESDP 
4.1 Capabilities 
One of the first obstacles the ESDP must overcome is the capabilities issue. 
This relates primarily to the issue of generating effective military capacity. 
Something contributing to this problem is that “defence budgets in most European 
countries [are] at best static or even declining from levels already low by US 
standards” (Crowe, 539: 2003). The problem is that the money is spent badly, and 
disproportionately on large, outmoded military forces (Gordon, 217: 2004). 
Western Europe's defense budget is almost two-thirds that of America, but it 
produces less than one-quarter of America's deployable fighting strength 
(Hulsman: 2000). The fact that the CFSP – the entity and policy of which the 
ESDP is a part of – receives very little funding does little to help the situation. 
One one hand, “in 2005, around 80% of the [CFSP] budget was spent on 
financing ESDP civilian operations”, while on the other hand, “the CFSP budget 
in 2005 only amounted to a mere 0.05% of EU spending“ (Grevi, 5: 2006). The 
realization of the full potential and continued growth of a project like the ESDP 
requires a significant amount of funding to be effective. This matter has not been 
made any easier by the establishment of the 2010 Headline Goal and Civilian 
Headline Goal 2008. The 2010 Headline Goal focused specifically on developing 
the qualitative aspects of capabilities, including interoperability, deployability, 
and sustainability (Taylor, 30: 2006). “The EU decided to augment its response 
capabilities by establishing 13 battlegroups by 2010. Each battlegroup will consist 
of 1,500 highly-trained, high-readiness troops, that can be deployed within 15 
days, for up to 4 months, either as a stand-alone force or as a “spearhead” force to 
prepare for a larger multinational peacekeeping effort” (Zervoudaki, 3: 2006). The 
establishment of this new headline goal was needed, especially given the different 
post-9/11 global security environment which no longer merely concerns the 
objectives laid out in the Petersberg Tasks in 1999. This Headline Goal is meant 
to help the EU “cover missions envisaged in the ESS: disarmament operations, 
support for third countries in fighting terrorism, and security sector reform 
missions” (“Brief”, 43: 2005). Somewhat like the 2010 Headline Goal, the 
Civilian Headline Goal 2008 focuses on expanding the qualitative and 
quantitiative civilian capabilities of the ESDP. Among the areas it will affect are 
“conflict prevention, security sector reform, disarmament, border control, and 
other civilian crisis management capabilities” (Taylor, 31: 2006). In addition to 
this, this Goal will also establish so-called “civilian crisis response teams”, which 
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will form a civilian counterpart to the ERRF that can quickly respond and provide 
humanitarian, political, legal and other non-military support in crisis situations.  
It is already known that the EU does not have anywhere near the defence 
budget of either the US or NATO, so it remains to be seen if the EU will be able 
to fully realize the 2010 Headline Goal and Civilian Headline Goal 2008 by each 
of their respective dates. In any case, the main issue is neither defence spending 
on high-end military capabilities nor overall troop numbers but effective 
deployability even for stability operations (Gordon, 217: 2004). A more realistic 
assumption is that it will take some time for the ESDP to realize its capabilities 
goals, especially given its relatively small budget and the inherent difficulties of 
getting the various Member States to coordinate their efforts for the realization of 
such goals. Indeed, the military part of the ESDP will have to be the core of the 
EU’s effort to advance from weakness to power, but the Europeans are aware that, 
in this respect, it will take some time (Rummel, 470: 2002). So far, according to 
many experts, ESDP is only fully operational in the area of peacekeeping 
missions, that is, in post-conflict situations, during which the stabilization of 
security and political reconstruction are the primary objectives (Flechtner, 5: 
2006). Despite this observation, the ESDP has proven that it can be effective in 
smaller-scale military intervention operations, such as when the EU intervened in 
the DRC. And the ESDP has already proven that it can very important contributor 
in post-conflict situations. If the ESDP continues to develop in the areas that it is 
currently lacking, then there is every reason to believe that it can be a significant 
actor in areas such as fighting terrorism, security sector reform, and other crisis 
management operations in the future.  
4.2 ESDP/EU and US/NATO Relations 
Another issue that the ESDP must confront is how it will continue to affect the 
EU relationship to the US and NATO. Even though the international security 
situation has changed drastically since 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq (among other 
events), actors on both sides of the Atlantic need to keep some things in 
perspective. For one, “the ESDP issue should not be dividing the United States 
and European Allies in any fundamental way” (Hunter, 160: 2002). As mentioned 
before, the ESDP was not created in order to create an EU counterbalance to the 
US and NATO. If anything, the creation and ongoing development of the ESDP 
should be welcomed by both the US and NATO, for a variety of reasons. For one, 
now that the EU is taking more responsibility for its own security in addition to 
crisis management and peacekeeping operations abroad, it frees up the US and 
NATO to focus their attention on areas that are more important to their own 
security interests. A good example of this is the ongoing “war on terror” and 
continued US involvement in the Middle East. The US preoccupation both with 
Middle East-based international terrorism and with potential, perhaps unintended, 
consequences of the campaign could lead to a significant reduction in US interest 
in the practical aspects of European security or in other regions nearby, such as 
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North Africa (Hunter, 172: 2002). In theory the ESDP can fill this gap. As it 
stands now, the bulk of US military forces, resources, and attention is focused 
squarely on Iraq and the fight against terrorism. So if the EU is able to shoulder 
the burden elsewhere and take care of business in its own backyard, why should 
the ESDP and the continued development of EU security and crisis management 
be seen as anything other than mutually beneficial for both sides?  
However, the intended relationship between the ESDP/EU and US/NATO 
often depends on who is making the observation. Depending on the viewpoints of 
the respective EU Member States or various US policy-makers, “making the EU 
stronger in the security and defence realm either to please or to challenge the 
United States, or either to strengthen the European contribution to the Western 
Alliance or to gain autonomy from US influence” (Peters, 395: 2004). One needs 
to keep in mind that the ESDP was not created to “appease or challenge” the US 
or to assert EU autonomy. Rather, a comprehensive perspective allow one to 
understand that the changing geopolitical situation after the end of the Cold War 
and subsequent crises in the Balkans revealed the need that the EU needed to 
assume responsibility for its own collective security. And although the US has 
been adamant about the ESDP not impinging on “US flexibility nor on NATO as 
America’s chief instrument for exerting influence in Europe” (ibid, 396), this is 
not likely to occur anytime soon, especially considering how much the capabilities 
of the ESDP pale in comparison to those of the EU and NATO. And besides, 
“Washington is more interested in the military capabilities of the European armed 
forces than in the civil component of the ESDP or in its integrative quality 
regarding the ‘completion’ of the Union” (Rummel, 468: 2002). Given that 80% 
of the crisis management operations that the ESDP currently undertakes are 
civilian missions, the US should not have too much to worry about. So whatever 
trajectory the ESDP continues to take, it should not continue to create a rift in EU-
NATO relations.  
Another point that both sides of the Atlantic need to realize it the need to “get 
the ESDP right”. The intention is to make the ESDP a workable and understood 
policy and “reduce this irritant to the degree possible and remove it as a 
complicating factor in addressing other transatlantic problems” (Hunter, 160: 
2002). The sometimes perpetual ambiguity as to what the ESDP is meant to do 
and its relationship to the US and NATO needs to be clear to all involved so that 
such issues no longer continue to impede its implementation and confound 
transatlantic relations. The ESDP is not irrelevant, it fills an important security 
need that arose after the end of the Cold War. It is not a “European army” and will 
never be on a scale that will challenge US military dominance. It was never 
intended to replace or undermine NATO. And it is not designed to “balance” US 
power in any realist sense (as mentioned earlier). It is rather an effective military 
and civilian crisis management tool that the EU can autonomously use in matters 
where the US or NATO chooses not to get involved (or it can even be used to 
support US and NATO missions if the EU so chooses). With ESDP, a compliment 
also to the range of economic and political tools constituting the Union’s “soft 
power”, the EU hopes to enhance security both in regions surrounding the Union 
– including the Balkans, the souther Mediterranean, the Middle East – and 
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beyond, and to foster multilateral solutions to security challenges (Zervoudaki, 1: 
2006).  
The events of 9/11 and the subsequent creation of the ESS were quite helpful 
in creating understanding as to what the expectations and goals of the ESDP were 
to both EU and US policy-makers. The eventual EU crisis over how to approach 
the situation in Iraq also brought to light the various foreign policy intentions of 
the EU Member States that were largely unclear before the crisis. This crisis 
created a much needed dialogue between the Member States which went a long 
way towards all of them being clear as to what they expected to get out of the 
ESDP. The Union has accepted the need for its defence policies to be closely 
linked to NATO, and has rejected the more ambitous aspirations of some of its 
member states (Menom, 648: 2004). This dialogue was largely absent before the 
Iraq crisis, and its continuation helped to reduce the ambiguities that continued to 
confuse policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic and has contributed to 
“getting the ESDP right” by creating more mutal understanding as to what the 
ESDP is for and how to go about achieving its goals. Broad agreement on a more 
limited ESDP has thus sidestepped the potential for disagreements over ambitions 
to undermine the policy altogether (ibid).  
The last point that the EU and NATO need to keep in mind is that efforts at 
mutual cooperation favor the interests of both sides. There is no apparent reason 
why serious efforts by US and EU leaders should not produce the desired results – 
a mutually reinforcing relationship between the EU, acting through ESDP, and 
NATO that works for all and for overall security in the transatlantic region 
(Hunter, 161: 2002). Despite the obstacles encountered during the Iraq crisis, 
there is a large amount of evidence showing that just such a relationship already 
exists. More connects the USA and EU than seperates them: the convergence of 
interests towards combating terrorism, the basic parallels between the US 
democratization project and the EU’s CFSP, and the desire for a stable Africa all 
suggest mutual cooperation (Giegerich, 403: 2006). It is apparent that neither the 
US nor the EU are capable of fighting terrorism or helping to stabilize Africa on 
their own, so mutual cooperation and US/NATO encouragement of ESDP 
development should be the norm. Americans, with their own plate full in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and potentially elsewhere, should want to see more such actions, and 
if acting under an EU rather than a NATO banner inspires greater European 
support, then it should be welcomed rather than condemned (Gordon, 219: 2004). 
 Also, medium-to-large scale missions undertaken by the ESDP will need 
NATO support for the foreseeable future. In addition to this, “Europe’s 
development as a military power might serve to alleviate the tension between US 
and European strategic perspectives” (Giegerich, 403: 2006). The hard/soft power 
divergence between the two would be likely to diminish if the EU continues to 
develop its own autonomous defence capabilities, thus actually giving it the 
option of using hard power in certain situations (and not being primarily 
dependent on methods of soft power). The development of its own military 
capabilities should also give the EU Member States a larger say in NATO security 
policy-making, something which the US should not necessarily fear. As a 
prominent French diplomat stated, “We simply want a better balance. If Europe 
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becomes more serious about its own defence, then it will earn the right to greater 
influence within NATO” (Oakes, 48: 2001).  
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5 Conclusion 
The ESDP has shown a remarkable ability to evolve since its inception in 1999. In 
the eight short years since its creation, it has certainly come a long way towards 
realizing its original intention of allowing the “EU to undertake security-related 
operations, such as peacekeeping and conflict prevention, and to develop a 
defense strategy and identity outside of, but complementary to, NATO and other 
international organizations” (Zervoudaki, 1: 2006). There are currently over 11 
ESDP missions underway involving both civilian and military capabilities, and 
this fact alone goes to show that the ESDP is much more than just a “paper tiger”. 
It is now a vital element of the EU’s CFSP, and will continue to further impact the 
EU’s global security profile as time goes on. However, there are still some issues 
that the ESDP must deal with if it is to become something that can truly add 
much-needed weight to the EU’s security capabilities. If the ESDP can effectively 
deal with these problems then it can ease a substantial amount of the security 
burden that has been solely in the hands of the US, NATO, and the UN for far too 
long. If the ESDP can give the EU the ability to manage crises in its own 
backyard as well as abroad, then that frees up actors such as the US, NATO, and 
the UN to focus their energies elsewhere, thereby improving the overall 
international security situation and even the (at times) strained transatlantic 
relationship. A fully-realized ESDP can even function as a bridge between EU 
and Russian security concerns, especially in those areas that constitute the EU-
Russian border. These are only some of the reasons why it is so important not 
only for the EU, but for the international community, to encourage the continued 
development of the  ESDP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  29 
6 Works Cited 
 
Alvarez-Verdugo, Milagros, 2006: “Mixing Tools Against Proliferation: The 
EU’s Strategy for Dealing with Weapons of Mass Destruction”, European 
Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 11, Issue 3, pp. 417-438. 
“Assembly of WEU Celebrates 10 years of “Petersberg”-Declaration on Crisis 
Management”, http://www.assembly-
weu.org/en/presse/cp/2002/030.php?PHPSESSID=f3137d60, 12 June 2002. 
Baylis, John, & Smith, Steve, 2001. The Globalization of World Politics. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
Berenskoetter, Felix, 2006. “Under Construction: ESDP and the Fight Against 
‘Organized Crime’”. 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/pdfs/EFPU%20Challenge%20Working%20Pap
er%205.pdf 
Biscop, Sven, 2002. “In Search of a Strategic Concept for the ESDP”, European 
Foreign Affairs Review vol. 7, issue 4, pp. 473-490. 
“Brief Guide to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)”. Permanent 
Representation of France to the European Union,  
http://www.rpfrance.eu/IMG/0601%20Brief%20guide%20to%20ESDP.pdf 
December 2005.  
Burchill, Scott, 2001. Theories of International Relations. New York: Palgrave. 
Clarke, Michael, and Cornish, Paul, 2002. “The European Defence Project and the 
Prague Summit”, International Affairs vol. 78, issue 4, pp. 777-778. 
Cornish, Paul, and Edwards, Geoffrey, 2001. “Beyond the EU/Nato dichotomy: 
The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture”, International Affairs vol. 
77, issue 3, pp. 587-603.   
Crowe, Brian, 2003. “A Common European Foreign Policy After Iraq?”, 
International Affairs vol. 79, issue 3, pp. 533-546.  
Crowe, Brian, 2006. “Toward a European Foreign Policy”, The Hague Journal of 
Democracy vol. 1, issue 1, pp. 107-114. 
Danilov, Dmitry, 2001. “The EU’s Rapid Reaction Capabilities: A Russian 
Perspective”, Institute of Europe, Moscow, http://www.eusec.org/danilov.htm 
Duke, Simon, and Ojanen, Hanna, 2006. “Bridging Internal and External Security: 
Lessons from the European Security and Defence Policy”, European 
Integration vol. 28, number 5, 477-494. 
“EU Security and Defence Policy”, http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/eu-
security-defence-policy/article-117486 6 January 2005. 
Fletchner, Stefanie, 2006. “European Security and Defence Policy: Between 
‘Offensive Defense’ and ‘Human Security’”, International Policy Analysis 
Unit,  http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04139.pdf 
  30 
Geigerich, Bastian, Pushinka, Darya, 2006. “Towards a Strategic Partnership? The 
US and Russian Response to the European Security and Defence Policy”, 
Security Dialogue vol. 37, issue 3, pp. 385-407. 
Gordon, Phillip H., 2004. “European Security and Defence Policy: The First Five 
Years”, EU Institute for Security Studies pp. 215-219, 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/gordon/20040901.htm 
Grevi, Giovanni, 2006. “The Future of ESDP”, EU Institute for Security Studies, 
Paris, 6 February 2006, http://www.iss-eu.org/activ/content/rep06-02.pdf 
Gunning Jr., Edward G., 2001. The Common European Security and Defence 
Policy. Colorado: DIANE Publishing. 
Guttman, Robert J., 2002. “WHAT THEY SAID: Fraser Cameron on CFSP, 
ESDP & the Balkans”, Europe issue 397, pp. 1-4. 
Hill, Cristopher, 2004. “Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 
11 September 2001”, Journal of Common Market Studies vol. 42, issue 1, pp. 
143-163 
Hix, Simon, 2005. The Political System of the European Union. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
Howorth, Jolyon, 2006. “A Work In Progress”, Harvard International Review vol. 
27, issue 4, pp. 83-84. 
Howorth, Jolyon, 2003. “France, Britain, and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis”, Survival 
vol. 45, issue 4, pp. 173-192.  
Hunter, Robert E., 2002. The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO’s 
Companion, or Competitor? The RAND Corporation.  
Hulsman, John C., 2000. “The Guns of Brussels”, Policy Review issue 101, pp. 
35-50. 
Jenkin, Bernard, 2002. “The War Against Terrorism, The EU’s Response, and the 
Future of NATO”,  http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/HL735.cfm 
Lijphart, Arend, 1969. “Comparative Politics and Comparative Method”, The 
American Political Science Review, vol. 65, pp. 682- 693. 
Menon, Anand, 2004. “From Crisis to Catharsis: ESDP After Iraq”, International 
Affairs vol. 80, issue 4, pp. 631-638. 
Muller, Brandbeck, and Bocquet, Gisela, 2002. “The New CFSP and ESDP 
Decision-Making System of the European Union”, European Foreign Affairs 
Review vol. 7, issue 3, pp. 257-282. 
Oakes, Mark, 2001. “European Security and Defence Policy: Nice and Beyond”, 
International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library, 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2001/rp01-050.pdf 
Odell, John S., 2001. “Case Study Methods in International Political Economy”, 
International Studies Perspectives, vol. 2, pp. 161-176. 
Payne, Dr. Kenneth, 2003. “The European Security and Defense Policy and the 
Future of NATO”, BBC News Analysis and Research  
http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/payne.pdf 
Peters, Ingo, 2004. “ESDP as a Transatlantic Issue”, International Studies Review 
vol. 6, issue 3, pp. 381-402. 
Rontoyanni, Clelia, 2002. “So far, so good? Russia and the ESDP”, International 
Affairs vol. 78, issue 4, pp. 813-830. 
  31 
Rummel, Reinhardt, 2002. “From Weakness to Power with the ESDP?”, 
European Foreign Affairs Review vol. 7, issue 4, pp. 453-471. 
Simon, Duke, and Ojanen, Hanna, 2006. “Bridging Internal and External Security: 
Lessons From the European Security and Defence Policy”, Revue 
d’integration europeene vol. 28, issue 5, pp. 477-494.  
Smith, Karen E., 2003. European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. 
United Kingdom: Polity Press. 
Soares, Claire, 2006. “Darfur Crisis Puts Sudan top of ‘Failed States’ List”, The 
Independent, 3 May 2006, 
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/africa/article361582.ece 
Solana, Javier, 2003. “A Secure Europe in a Better World”. European Security 
Strategy. http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf  
Strömvik, Maria, 2005. To Act as a Union: Explaining the Development of the 
EU’s Collective Foreign Policy. Lund University: Lund Political Studies. 
Taylor, Claire, 2006. “European Security and Defence Policy: Developments 
Since 2003”, International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons 
Library, 
http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/European_Security_and_Defence_Pol
icy_Developments_Since_2003.pdf 
Terzi, Ozlem, 2002. “New Capabilities, Old Relationships: Emergent ESDP and 
EU-Turkish Relations”. Southeast European Politics vol.III, no. 1, pp. 43-61. 
“The European Security and Defence Policy”. http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/de/Infoservice/Broschueren/ESVP-EN.pdf 
Watanabe, Lisa, 2005. “The ESDP: Between Estrangement and a New Partnership 
in Transatlantic Security Relations”, Journal of Contemporary European 
Studies vol. 13, issue 1, pp. 5-20. 
Zervoudaki, Stella (ed.), 2006. “European Security and Defense Policy: Working 
for a Safer World”, eufocus, January 2006, 
http://www.eurunion.org/News/eunewsletters/EUFocus/2006/EUFocus-
ESDP.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
